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Abstract 
When considering the social valuation of a life-year, there is a conflict between two basic intuitions: on the one 
hand, the intuition of universality, according to which the value of an additional life-year should be universal, 
and, as such, should be invariant to the context considered; on the other hand, the intuition of complementarity, 
according to which the value of a life-year should depend on what this extra life-year allows for, and, hence, on 
the quality of that life-year, because the quantity of life and the quality of life are complement to each other. This 
paper proposes three distinct accounts of the intuition of universality, and shows that those accounts either 
conflict with a basic monotonicity property, or lead to indifference with respect to how life-years are distributed 
within the population. Those results support the abandon of the intuition of universality. But abandoning the 
intuition of universality does not prevent a social evaluator from giving priority, when allocating life-years, to 
individuals with the lowest quality of life. 
Keywords: value of life, quality of life, social evaluation, universality, complementarity. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
As highlighted by Sen (1973) in his early criticism of national accounts statistics, the 
measurement of the achievements of a society can hardly abstract from how long the 
members of that society live. Individual lifetime is a key dimension to be taken into account 
in the measurement of social achievements, whatever one wants to measure the degree of 
development of a society, or to measure social welfare. That intuition motivated the inclusion 
of indicators of human lifetime – such as period life expectancy at birth – in the construction 
of indexes of development, such as the Human Development Index (see UNDP 1990, 2010), 
and in the construction of inclusive indexes of well-being, such as the equivalent income (see 
Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013). Moreover, since various public policies modify the production 
and the distribution of life-years within a population (e.g. health care programs, transportation 
policies and environmental policies), the lifetime dimension can hardly be ignored when 
considering the design of policies (see Sen 1998, Broome 1999, 2004). 
Taking human lifetime into account requires the social evaluator or the government to 
find a way to weight the quantity of life-years against other relevant dimensions of life. In 
other terms, the social evaluator needs to find a way to assign a value to life-years. Assigning 
a value to life-years is necessary not only for the measurement of human development or 
well-being, but, also, to be able to solve policy dilemmas involving various implications in 
terms of the production and distribution of life-years within a population. This necessity to 
assign a value to life-years has given rise, in economics, to the increasingly large literature on 
the value of a statistical life (see Jones-Lee 1989).
3
 Empirical estimates of the value of a 
statistical life have become key parameters in cost-benefit analyses, as well as in the study of 
optimal policies, in particular in the context of climate change. 
The empirical literature on the value of a statistical life has a purely positive nature: it 
aims at quantifying how individuals tend, in real life, to solve trade-offs involving risk about 
the duration of life, or, in other words, how individuals are willing to exchange money against 
variations of the risk of death. Empirical studies of various kinds (wage-risk studies, 
contingent valuation methods, etc.) show that the value of a statistical life is varying with 
several factors, such as the age or the occupation, and is increasing with income. For instance, 
Miller (2000) provides, in his meta-analysis of empirical studies, a rule of thumb for the 
valuation of a life, which is a simple linear transformation of the GDP per capita.
4
 
Obviously, it does not logically follow from those empirical studies that, when 
measuring social achievements or designing policy objectives, the social evaluator should 
make the valuation of life or the valuation of a life-year dependent on income or on any of 
those factors. Empirical studies on the value of life may well show that the value of a life-year 
is increasing with income, but such a positive premise cannot, if taken separately, lead to any 
normative corollary. Drawing such a conclusion would be nothing else than an occurrence of 
a naturalistic fallacy. There is thus a need to examine, at the normative level, how a social 
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 The value of a statistical life is defined as the value that x individuals assign to a reduction of the risk of death 
from 1/x to 0, leading to saving one life.  
4
 According to Miller (2000), the value of a statistical life lies between 120 and 180 times GDP per capita. 
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evaluator should value an extra life-year, that is, the principles that should govern such a 
valuation of life-years. 
From a normative perspective, the valuation of a life-year leads to two conflicting 
intuitions: on the one hand, the intuition of universality; on the other hand, the intuition of 
complementarity. 
According to the intuition of universality, the value of a life-year should be universal. 
The value of a life-year should be the same whatever the contexts considered; in particular, a 
life-year should have exactly the same value, whatever we consider a poor or a rich country. 
Thus, from that perspective, the fact that life-years are more valued in richer countries than in 
poorer countries should be totally irrelevant when considering the social valuation of those 
life-years: universalism requires to value life-years in the same way independently from the 
context, and, in particular, independently from the associated quality of life.  
Such an intuition of universality concerning life-year valuations was defended, among 
others, by Anand (2017), who criticized the new HDI – based on a geometric average rather 
than on an arithmetic average across income, lifetime and education dimensions – on the 
grounds that it violates this intuition of universal valuation of life-years.
5
 According to Anand 
(2017), the value of an extra life-year should be the same, whatever one considers a rich or a 
poor country. That intuition of universality is satisfied by the standard HDI, but not by the 
multiplicative HDI. 
This intuition of universality conflicts with another intuition, which can be called the 
intuition of complementarity. According to that intuition, the quantity of life cannot be valued 
independently from the quality of life. The reason lies in the singular nature of lifetime in 
comparison to other goods. Lifetime is not a good like a standard good, which could be 
enjoyed on its own. On the contrary, lifetime is like a “container”, whose value depends on 
what it will allow for, that is, on what lies “within the container” (life-events, activities, life-
projects, etc.). As a consequence, the valuation of life-years cannot be made independently 
from the associated quality of life. A corollary of this is that, when the quality of life varies, 
the value of the quantity of life cannot remain the same, and, hence, cannot be universal, in 
opposition to what the intuition of universality recommends. 
The intuition of complementary can take two forms: on the one hand, a weak version, 
according to which the value of a life-year depends, among other things, on the quality of that 
life-year; on the other hand, a strong version, according to which the value of a life-year 
depends only on the quality of that life-year. Although the latter version is much stronger than 
the former, it finds some support in several simple thought experiments. For instance, if one 
could artificially slowdown life, but without modifying the number of life-events that take 
place in that life, then one could hardly regard this lengthening of life as valuable: enlarging 
the size of the “container” without modifying its content could hardly make a life better. 
Alternatively, consider another thought experiment, where one can shutdown life during one 
hour, and, by this, shorten all lives by that amount, without anyone being aware of that 
shutdown. As long as this temporary shutdown was unnoticed, and did not affect events 
among humans, it is hard to see how this reduction of the size of the “container” could have 
reduced the value of life. Those thought experiments provide some support for the strong 
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version of the intuition of complementarity. But it is important to stress that even the weak 
version of that intuition is in conflict with the intuition of universality. 
In order to better present the differences between the intuition of universality and the 
intuition of complementarity, it can also be useful to refer to the concept of intrinsic value of 
life, that is, the value of life per se, independently from the characteristics of that life. 
According to the intuition of universality, the value of a life-year is composed exclusively of 
its intrinsic value, and, thus, does not depend on the quality of that life-year (only the 
“container” has value). On the contrary, the weak version of the intuition of complementarity 
states that the value of a life-year may or may not have an intrinsic component, but, for sure, 
includes a component that is related to the quality of that life-year (what is inside the 
“container” matters, and possibly the “container” as well). Finally, the strong version of the 
intuition of complementarity states that the value of a life-year only includes a component that 
is related to its quality, and includes no intrinsic value component (only what is inside the 
“container” is valued, not the “container” itself). 
The incompatibility between the intuition of universality and the intuition of 
complementarity raises deep challenges for the valuation of life-years. Although this is not 
often explicitly acknowledged, a large part of the literature on the valuation of life relies on 
the intuition of complementarity, and, as such, violates the intuition of universality.
6
 Those 
violations are problematic only to the extent that the intuition of universality is worth being 
pursued. But the ethical appeal of the intuition of universality is hard to evaluate, simply 
because no precise account of that intuition has been given so far. As a consequence, it is 
difficult to have an idea of the precise implications of adopting such an intuition. 
The goal of this paper is precisely to provide a more accurate account of the intuition 
of universality. In order to better understand what the intuition of universality is, we propose 
to study its implications for the valuation of life-years. For that purpose, this paper will 
proceed in two stages. In a first stage, we provide three distinct definitions of the intuition of 
universality, in terms of the constraints this intuition imposes on the form of value functions 
aimed at valuing life-years. That first approach informs us about the formal constraints that 
the intuition of universality imposes on the valuation of the quantity and the quality of life, 
but does not inform us, in general, about the priority to be given in allocation problems. Then, 
in a second stage, we consider a more general approach, in terms of social preferences, and 
reformulate those three accounts of the intuition of universality, in order to explore their 
consequences in terms of priority when considering problems of life-years allocations. 
Anticipating on our results, we show that the three distinct accounts of the intuition of 
universality lead to counterintuitive implications from a normative perspective. One of these 
accounts is shown to be in conflict with a basic property of monotonicity, whereas two other 
accounts of the intuition of universality lead to indifference with respect to how life-years are 
distributed within the population, which is a quite negative result. Thus adopting a universal 
perspective on life-years valuations – and, thus, abstracting from the associated quality of 
those life-years – leads to quite questionable consequences. Those negative results support the 
abandon of the intuition of universality. However, we show that abandoning the intuition of 
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 This is true for indicators of well-being relying on a lifecycle perspective, such as the equivalent income (see 
Costa and Steckel 1997, Nordhaus, 2003, Becker et al 2005, Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013). This is also the case 
for normative studies on compensation for unequal lifetime (see Fleurbaey and Ponthiere 2013). 
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universality, and adopting instead the intuition of complementarity, does not prevent a social 
evaluator from giving priority, when allocating life-years, to individuals with the lowest 
quality of life. 
This paper is related to several branches of the literature. First of all, this paper is 
connected to the philosophical literature on the normative foundations of the valuation of life. 
There is, in philosophy, an old tradition of thought dealing with the goodness of life and the 
evil of death, which dates back, at least, to the works of Epicurus (1926). In the 20
th
 century, 
Epicurus’s view – death is not bad, since all good and evil consist in sensation – was rejected 
by Nagel (1979), according to whom many sorts of evils are unexperienced, and, also, by 
McMahan (1988), who argued that the badness of a death depends on what would have 
happened if the person had not died. More recently, the philosophical foundations for the 
valuation of life-years have been reexamined in the works of Broome (1993, 1999, 2004). Our 
paper is strongly connected with Broome’s accounts of the value of life and life-years. 
Actually, there is a formal similarity between some arguments developed by Broome (2004) 
against the intuition of neutrality in the context of valuing the life of a person, and some of 
our arguments against the intuition of universality in the context of valuing a life-year. 
Secondly, this paper is also related to the economics literature on the measurement of human 
development, such as Ravallion (2012) and Anand (2017), who criticized the geometric HDI 
on the grounds of an intuition that is strongly related to the intuition of universality as 
explored in this paper. We actually show how some accounts of the intuition of universality 
can lead to a measure of development that has a similar structure to the standard (additive) 
HDI. Our paper is also related to multidimensional indicators of well-being inclusive of the 
lifetime dimension, such as the equivalent income (see Costa and Steckel 1997, Nordhaus 
2003, Becker et al 2005, Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013). Thirdly, this paper is also related to 
the normative literature on fairness in the context of life and death, such as Fleurbaey and 
Ponthiere (2013) and Adler et al (2014). The design of optimal policies is not independent 
from how lives are valued. This makes the distinction between the intuition of universality 
and the intuition of complementarity most relevant for policy purposes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 present three distinct accounts 
of the intuition of universality and explores their consequences on the structural form of value 
functions. Then, Section 3 reformulates the three accounts of the intuition of universality in an 
alternative framework – based on social preference orderings – and explores their 
implications for the social ranking of distributions along the quantity and quality of life 
dimensions. Section 4 proposes simple ways to reconcile the abandon of the intuition of 
universality with the priority given to individuals with low qualities of life in problems of life-
years allocation. Concluding remarks are left to Section 5. 
 
 
2. Three accounts of the intuition of universality (1): an axiological approach 
 
 
According to the intuition of universality, the valuation of a life-year is independent 
from the context under study, and, thus, independent from the associated quality of life. When 
stated in that way, that intuition is quite general, and is definitely in need of a more exact 
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formulation, since the independence to which it refers may take various distinct forms. In this 
section, we propose three distinct accounts of the intuition of universality.  
For that purpose, we adopt an axiological approach: our main object of study is a value 
function V(.), which is defined on a life, which is itself defined as a vector (a, b, …, k) whose 
entries a, b, …, k correspond to the quality of each life-year. This section explores the formal 
constraints that the intuition of universality imposes on the structure of the value function 
V(.). As such, this constitutes a first step towards a better understanding of the intuition of 
universality. 
At the very outset, it should be stressed that a first, basic reading of the intuition of 
universality consists of stating that the value of a given life (x,…,x) in a country C should be 
exactly equal to the value of the same life in another country C’. That basic conception of the 
universality of the valuation of life-years is presented below, as the intuition U0. 
 
 
The intuition of universality (U0) 
 
V((x, …, x)country C) = V((x, …, x)country C’) 
 
 
The formulation U0 of the intuition of universality is quite intuitive: it makes a lot of 
sense to assume that the value of a life does not depend on the country where that life takes 
place. U0 is thus a quite intuitive property that a value function V(.) should satisfy. 
Note, however, that the property U0 is not really original, because it coincides merely 
with a standard anonymity condition (see Blackorby et al 2005). Anonymity being widely 
used in social evaluations – without an explicit reference to the intuition of universality – we 
believe that the property U0 does not exhaust what the intuition of universality is about, and, 
in some sense, does not suffice to do justice to the intuition of universality. Therefore we will, 
in the rest of this paper, take U0 for granted – but as an anonymity condition – and explore the 
consequences of alternative formulations of the intuition of universality.  
The intuition of universality can be formulated in terms of the variation of value 
induced by the addition of an extra life-year. One possible formulation of the intuition of 
universality consists of stating that the variation of value associated to the addition of an extra 
life-year should depend neither on the quality of the added life-year, nor on the quality of 
previous life-years, nor on the number of previous life-periods (duration of initial lives). That 
account of the intuition of universality can be formulated as follows. 
 
 
The intuition of universality (U1) 
 
V((a,…, g) + x) – V((a, …, g)) = V((h, …, m) + y) – V((h, …, m)) 
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The left-hand side of the above equality is the variation in value when a life-year with 
a quality x is added to a life of quality (a, …, g), whereas the right-hand side is the variation in 
value when a life-year with quality y is added to a life of quality (h, …, m). 
The formulation U1 of the intuition of universality states that the value of a life-year is 
universal, in the sense that it involves a triple independence: (i) independence with respect to 
the quality of the added life-year; (ii) independence with respect to the quality of previous 
life-years; (iii) independence with respect to the duration of initial lives to which a life-year is 
added (since the left-hand side and the right-hand-side of the above equality may involve 
initial lives of unequal lengths). As such, the formulation U1 captures a strong conception of 
universality.  
To see how strong that conception of universality is, let us take the case of the addition 
of a life-year either in the United States, where average standards of living and life 
expectancy are high, or, alternatively, in Ghana, where standards of living and life expectancy 
are lower. The condition U1 states that the addition of a life-year in the United States (with 
U.S. standards of living) has exactly the same value as the addition of a life-year in Ghana 
(with Ghana’s standards of living). That condition states also that adding an extra life-year in 
Ghana with U.S. standards of living has the same value as adding an extra-life year in the U.S. 
with Ghana’s standards of living. 
Although it may seem appealing at first glance, the formulation U1 of the intuition of 
universality has implications that are not attractive. In particular, the formulation U1 enters in 
conflict with the monotonicity condition, stating that the value of a life is increasing in its 
quality. To see that conflict, let us take, here again, the example of the addition of a life-year 
in the United States or in Ghana, with either U.S. life quality (equal to 2) or with Ghana’s 
quality (equal to 1). Here are four alternative options: 
 
A: Adding a life-year in Ghana with Ghana’s standards of living. 
B: Adding a life-year in the U.S. with U.S.’s standards of living. 
C: Adding a life-year in Ghana with U.S.’s standards of living. 
D: Adding a life-year in the U.S. with Ghana’s standards of living. 
 
The conception U1 of the intuition of universality implies that the value assigned to 
the addition of a life-year in case A must be equal to the value assigned to the addition of a 
life-year in case B, that is:  
 
V((1,…,1) + 1) – V((1,…,1)) = V((2,…,2) + 2) – V((2,…,2)). 
 
However, by monotonicity, we have also that the value assigned to the addition of a 
life-year in case C exceeds the value assigned to the addition of a life-year in case A (where 
the added life-year has a lower quality, while everything else is left unchanged), that is: 
 
 V((1,…,1) + 2) – V((1,…,1)) > V((1,…,1) + 1) – V((1,…,1)). 
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Still by monotonicity, we have also that the value assigned to the addition of a life-
year in case B exceeds the value assigned to the addition of a life-year in case D (where, here 
again, the added life-year has a lower quality, everything else remaining unchanged), that is: 
 
V((2,…,2) + 2) – V((2,…,2)) > V((2,…,2) + 1) – V((2,…,2)). 
 
Given that V((1,…,1) + 2) > V((1,…,1) + 1), and V((2,…,2) + 2) > V((2,…,2) + 1), 
one obtains, from the first equality, the following inequality: 
 
V((1,…,1) + 2) – V((1,…,1) >  V((2,…,2) + 1) – V((2,…,2)). 
 
This inequality means that adding a life-year with U.S. standards in Ghana leads to a 
higher gain in value compared to adding a life-year with Ghana’s standards in the U.S.  
That inequality is in contradiction with the formulation U1 of the intuition of 
universality. According to that conception of universality, for sure adding a life-year with 
U.S. standards in Ghana should be equally good to adding a life-year with Ghana’s standards 
in the U.S. Hence, we reach here a contradiction, which implies that the formulation U1 of 
universality is not logically compatible with the monotonicity condition. 
That proof by contradiction is formally close to the argument developed by Broome 
(2004) concerning the logical incompatibility of the intuition of neutrality for the addition of a 
life with the principle of personal good. Note that another way to prove that the property U1 is 
incompatible with monotonicity consists of examining the constraints that that formulation of 
the intuition of universality imposes on the structural form of the value function V(.).  
The property U1 implies that the variation in value associated to an extra life year, i.e. 
V((a,…, g) + x) – V((a, …, g)), depends neither on the quality and quantity of other life-years, 
nor on the quality of the added life-year. The variation in value associated to the added life-
years is thus a constant. Denoting that constant by c, one can deduce, by repeated 
substitutions, that: 
 
     V((a, …, g) + x) = V((a, …, g)) + c 
      [L years + 1]        [L years] 
↔ V((a, …, g) + x) = V((a, …, f)) + c + c    
     [L years + 1]        [L – 1 years] 
↔ V((a, …, g) + x) = (L + 1)c    
     [L years + 1]         
 
Thus the formulation U1 of the intuition of universality implies that the value function 
V(.) has a simple form: it is equal to the number of life-years multiplied by a constant. Hence, 
the formulation U1 of the intuition of universality implies that only the total lifetime matters, 
independently from the quality of life. Thus one can see, here again, that the formulation U1 
of the intuition of universality is not compatible with the monotonicity property.  
Given the natural appeal of the monotonicity condition, the logical incompatibility of 
the U1 formulation of the intuition of universality with monotonicity is quite problematic. 
This suggests that this formulation of the intuition of universality is too demanding, or too 
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strong, which leads to incompatibilities with a property as simple as monotonicity. Therefore, 
in the rest of this section, we will propose to depart from the U1 formulation of the intuition 
of universality, and reformulate that intuition in different ways. 
As we emphasized above, the formulation U1 of the intuition of universality was quite 
strong, since it involved a triple independence of the value of the extra life-year, with respect 
to the quality of the added life-year, with respect to the quality of previous life-years, and with 
respect to the number of previous life-years. In the remaining of this section, we will focus on 
weaker formulations of the intuition of universality, which relaxes some of those 
independence requirements. 
 
 
The intuition of universality (U2) 
 
V((x,…, x) + x) – V((x, …, x)) = V((y, …, y) + y) – V((y, …, y)) 
 
 
The formulation U2 of the intuition of universality states that the value of an extra life-
year whose quality is equal to the quality of previous life-years should be universal, that is, 
independent from the quality of (previous and added) life-years, and, also, independent from 
the initial lengths of lives (since the left-hand side and the right-hand side may involve 
initially lives of unequal lengths). Thus the formulation U2 involves, as the formulation U1, a 
triple independence of the value of an extra life-year. 
However, the conception U2 of universality is weaker than the conception U1, since in 
U2 the equality of the value of an extra life-year is conditional on its quality being equal to 
the quality of previous life-years, unlike what prevailed under U1. Thus U2 states the triple 
independence requirement only for lives of constant quality, and not for lives of non-constant 
quality. This limits the scope of the triple independence, and, as such, makes the conception 
U2 of the intuition of universality weaker than the conception U1. 
In order to understand the implications of the formulation U2 of the intuition of 
universality on the form of the value function V(.), it is useful to notice that the variation in 
value due to the addition of a life-year of constant quality is the same on both sides of the 
above equation, despite the fact that the (constant) quality of life-years is not the same on the 
left-hand side and on the right-hand side, and despite also the fact that the lives being 
compared may initially differ also in terms of sizes. As a consequence, the variation in value 
due to the addition of a life-year must be independent from the (constant) quality of life, and 
from the length of the initial life. Therefore, this variation must be equal to a constant. Writing 
that constant with the letter c, we have,  
 
V((x, …, x) + x) – V((x, …, x)) = c 
 
Hence, we obtain, by successive substitutions: 
 
     V((x, …, x) + x) = V((x, …, x)) + c 
     [L years + 1]        [L years] 
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↔ V((x, …, x)) = V((x, …,x)) + c + c    
     [L years + 1]   [L – 1 years] 
↔ V((x, …, x)) = V(x) + (L – 1)c    
     [L years + 1]   [1 year]      
 
The value function V(x, …, x) thus takes the form of a linear combination of the value 
of a single life-year V(x), and of the length of that life.
7
 Note that this formulation of the 
intuition of universality leads to a value function that is increasing in the quality of the added 
life-year (i.e. x), and, as such, satisfies the monotonicity condition, unlike the – stronger – 
formulation U1 of the intuition of universality. 
Quite interestingly, the United Nations’ Human Development Index, in its initial form 
(UNDP 1990) is additive in an index of life expectancy achievements, and in an index of GDP 
per capita achievements (and, also, in an index of education achievements). Hence, the initial 
HDI has a functional form that is compatible with the conception U2 of the intuition of 
universality, in the sense that it values the addition of a life-year with constant quality 
independently from the (constant) quality, and independently from the length of initial lives. 
The standard HDI thus captures the formulation U2 of the intuition of universality. 
Whereas the above discussion assumes a constant quality of life profile, it may be 
useful to generalize that discussion to the case where the lifetime quality profile is not 
constant, and is, for example, equal to {a, b, …, h). One could then consider a value function 
V(.) that is, as above, additive, but takes the (more general) form: V(X) + (L – 1)c, where X 
denotes the generalized mean of life quality. 
If the generalized mean of the quality of life X is equal to the quality of the added life-
year (i.e. x), then that value function satisfies the property U2. Note also that, provided the 
generalized mean of the quality of life X is increasing in the quality of the added life-year (i.e. 
x), this value function satisfies also the monotonicity condition.
8
 Moreover, the value function 
V(.) allows for a certain degree of complementarity between lifetime quantity and lifetime 
quality, something that was not possible under the formulation U1 of the intuition of 
universality. Clearly, adding a life-year with a quality above the average quality (i.e. x > X) is 
here regarded as good (i.e. increases value), whereas adding a life-year with a quality inferior 
to the average quality (i.e. x < X) is bad (i.e. reduces value). Finally, adding a life-year with a 
quality exactly equal to the average quality (i.e. x = X) is neutral. 
Those positive results hold thanks to the fact that U2 is a weaker formulation of the 
intuition of universality than U1. It is thus compatible with monotonicity and also with some 
degree of complementarity, but at the cost of weakening the requirement of universality (with 
respect to formulation U1). 
Let us now consider an alternative formulation of the intuition of universality, which 
imposes not an independence of the value of the extra life-year with respect to the quality of 
the added life-year, but an independence only with respect to the quality of previous life-years 
                                                          
7
 Indeed, it is possible to add an extra term c on the right-hand side while still respecting the condition U2, which 
leads to V(x, …, x) = V(x) + cL. 
8
 Note that the generalized mean quality is not necessarily increasing in x. One could have X = min{a, b, …, h, 
x} = a ≠ x, or X = max{a, b, …, h, x} = d ≠ x. 
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(which may not be constant, unlike under U2), and with respect to the number of previous 
life-years. This is the formulation U3 of the intuition of universality. 
 
 
The intuition of universality (U3) 
 
V((a, b, …, g) + z) – V((a, b, …, g)) = V((h, i, …, m) + z) – V((h, i, …, m)) 
 
 
The formulation U3 of the intuition of universality involves a double independence of 
the valuation of an extra life-year: (i) independence with respect to the quality of previous 
life-years, and (ii) independence with respect to the quantity of previous life-years (since the 
number of previous life-years involved on the left-hand side and on the right-hand side may 
differ). 
To understand the implications of the formulation U3 of the intuition of universality 
on the structure of the value function V(.), let us notice that, since the variation of value due to 
the addition of a life-year does not depend on the quality and quantity of previous life-years, it 
can only depend on the quality of the added life-year, that is, on z. Hence, we have: 
 
V((a, b, …, g) + z) – V((a, b, …, g)) = vL(z) 
 
where vL(z) is a function of z. 
Hence we obtain, by repeated substitution: 
 
     V((a, b, …, g) + z) = V((a, b, …, g)) + vL(z) 
     [L years + 1]             [L years] 
↔ V((a, b, …, g) + z) = V((a, b, …)) + vL-1(g) + vL(z) 
     [L years + 1]             [L – 1 years] 
↔ V((a, b, …, g) + z) = V(a) + v2(b) +… + vL-1(g) + vL(z) 
     [L years + 1]          [1 year] 
 
where v2(.), …, vL(.) are functions of the quality of each life-year. 
 
The formulation U3 of the intuition of universality has thus a precise implication on 
the structure of the value function V(.). Actually, it imposes that the value function V(.) is a 
sum of the transformed qualities of all life-years involved, with a number of terms equal to the 
number of life-years in the life under study. 
Quite interestingly, the functional form for V(.) implied by the property U3 satisfies 
the monotonicity condition, unlike the property U1. Moreover, it allows also for some degree 
of complementarity between the quality and the quantity of life. As for the formulation U2 of 
the intuition of universality, those positive results arise thanks to the fact that the property U3 
is a weaker formulation of the intuition of universality. That more limited universality 
requirement allows for some compatibility with monotonicity and with the intuition of 
complementarity, but at the cost of weakening the universality requirement.  
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In sum, this section showed that the intuition of universality for the valuation of a life-
year can be formulated in quite distinct ways, which all have their particular implications for 
the structure of the value function that measures the value of a life as a whole. Note, however, 
that although this section allowed us to provide precise accounts of the intuition of 
universality, and to explore the consequences of those formulations on the structure of value 
functions, this section had little to say, in general, about how priorities should be given when 
allocating life-years within the population. Actually, the variations in value associated to the 
addition of a life-year do not have direct implications in terms of priority, except if one adopts 
the social objective of maximizing the sum, across all individuals, of values V(.). 
If one adopts that particular social objective, then an interesting thing to notice is that 
the formulations U1, U2 and U3 of the intuition of universality share an important direct 
implication in terms of social priority: these all imply social indifference regarding how life-
years are allocated within the population. Thus those three conceptions of the intuition of 
universality lead the social evaluator to be indifferent with respect to how those life-years are 
distributed. That result is not particularly appealing: from an egalitarian perspective, one may 
prefer to give social priority to individuals whose lives are of low quality or of limited 
quantity. This view is clearly not compatible with the formulations U1, U2 and U3 of the 
intuition of universality, at least if the goal is to maximize the sum of values V(.) across 
individuals. 
It should be stressed, however, that there is no obvious reason why the social evaluator 
should take, as an objective, the maximization of the sum of individual values V(.). Many 
other social goals could be adopted instead, and in those cases the above formulations of the 
intuition of universality do not have direct implications in terms of priority. The goal of the 
next section is to develop an alternative approach, in terms of social preference orderings, in 
order to explore, under more general social objectives, the implications of the three 
conceptions of the intuition of universality developed above for the allocation of life-years 
within a population. 
 
 
3. Three accounts of the intuition of universality (2): a social preference approach 
 
 
Let us now examine what are the implications of the intuition of universality in terms 
of priority in the context of a problem of life-years allocation. For that purpose, let us define 
an allocation as a vector of quality of life for each individual in the population, whose size is 
supposed to be constant and equal to N. Formally, an allocation can be written as a vector q = 
(qi)i = 1, …, N, where qi = (qi1, …, qili) is the life of individual i, who enjoys a life of length li. We 
denote by Q the set of all such allocations. We denote by Q
C
 the subset of Q that includes all 
allocations with constant quality along the life. Regarding individual longevities, we define by 
l the vector of individual durations of life (number of life-years). We have that l = (li)i = 1,…,N. 
Let us now reformulate the three conceptions of the intuition of universality studied in 
Section 2 in terms of their logical consequences concerning the social ranking of allocations. 
In this section, we denote that social pre-ordering as ≤S. That social preference relation is 
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assumed to be reflexive, transitive and complete. As usual, strict social preference is denoted 
by <S, whereas social indifference is written as ~S. 
Throughout this section, the intuition of universality will be formulated in terms of 
whether adding an extra life-year to a person i is equivalent to adding an extra life-year to a 
person j, which is, from a formal perspective, equivalent to stating that transferring a life-year 
from individual j to individual i leads to social indifference. Thus, even if the formulations of 
the intuition of universality developed below look like properties about “transfers” of life-
years across individuals, these are only a formal way to formulate conditions of social 
indifference about who receives the extra life-year. 
In terms of the pre-ordering on allocations, the formulation U1 of the intuition of 
universality states that a change in who receives an additional life-year, everything else being 
left unchanged, leads to an allocation that is regarded, from a social perspective, as equally 
good as the initial allocation, independently from the quality of the added life-year, and 
independently from the quantity and the quality of previous life-years.  
 
 
The intuition of universality (U1) 
 
For all q, q’ in Q, if qit = qit’ for all i, t in {1, 2, …, min(li, li’)}, and if there exists i, j 
such that: li’ = li + 1 and lj’ = lj – 1 and for all k ≠ i, j, lk’ = lk, then q ~S q’. 
 
 
From the perspective of U1, it does not matter whether an additional life-year is given 
to a person with a more or less long life, or with a life of more or less high quality: changing 
the recipient of the extra life-year leads neither to a social improvement, nor to a social 
worsening, but is just neutral. As such, the conception U1 captures some idea of universality 
in the valuation of life-years. It states that one is socially indifferent between allocating an 
extra life-year to a given life or to another life. 
Note that this social indifference associated to who receives the extra life-year 
amounts to assume that the social valuation of life-years satisfies a triple independence: (i) 
independence with respect to the quality of the added life-year; (ii) independence with respect 
to the quality of previous life-years; (iii) independence with respect to the quantity of previous 
life-years. 
Although the formulation U1 may seem intuitive at first glance, it has implications that 
are not so attractive regarding the allocation of life-years. In particular, it is incompatible with 
a basic monotonicity property. The monotonicity property can be stated as follows. 
 
 
Monotonicity 
 
For all q, q’ in Q, if l = l’, if qit’ > qit for some i, t in {1, …, li} and qit’ = qit for all 
other i, t in {1, …, li}, then q’ >S q. 
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The monotonicity property is quite weak: it states that if some allocation q’ involves a 
higher quality of life-years for some individuals in comparison to the allocation q, everything 
else remaining the same in q’ and q, then the allocation q’ is, from a social perspective, 
strictly better than the allocation q. 
In order to see why the formulation U1 of the intuition of universality is logically 
incompatible with the monotonicity property, let us consider two allocations q and q’ 
satisfying the conditions described in U1, and let us add a third allocation, denoted by q’’, 
which is the same as the allocation q’, except that it involves a strictly higher quality of life 
for the extra life-year enjoyed by individual i, that is, that qili’’ > qili’. 
It is easy to see that, when comparing allocations q and q’’, the formulation U1 of the 
intuition of universality implies that there must be social indifference between q and q’’, for 
the same reasons as there is social indifference between q and q’. We thus have, by property 
U1, that: 
 
q ~S q’’ and q ~S q’ 
 
This implies, by transitivity, that: 
 
q’ ~S q’’ 
 
However, the monotonicity property requires that:  
 
q’’ >S q’ 
  
Thus we reach here a contradiction. That contradiction implies that the social ranking of 
allocations cannot satisfy both the formulation U1 of the intuition of universality and the 
monotonicity property. A choice is to be made between those properties.  
 Given the natural appeal of the monotonicity condition for the social ranking of 
allocations, this negative result supports to give up the intuition of universality, at least under 
its U1 formulation. Actually, if being universalist regarding the valuation of life-years implies 
to violate monotonicity, and thus to be socially indifferent between allocations that are not 
equivalent at all, then the attractiveness of such a universalism can be questioned. 
It should be stressed, however, that the above negative result only concerns the 
formulation U1 of the intuition of universality. As such, this cannot be generalized to all 
conceptions of the intuition of universality. 
Let us now consider the implications of the second formulation of the intuition of 
universality on the allocation of life-years. Translated in terms of requirements regarding the 
social preference relation, the formulation U2 can be rewritten as:   
 
 
The intuition of universality (U2) 
 
For all q, q’ in QC, if qi1 = qi1’ for all i, and if there exists i, j such that: li’ = li +1 and lj’ 
= lj – 1 and for all k ≠ i, j, lk’ = lk, then q ~S q’. 
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Thus U2 states that, when comparing allocations with constant quality along lives, a 
change in the recipient of an extra life-year from person j to person i (while keeping 
everything else unchanged) leads to social indifference. Whatever the durations of life for the 
individuals i and j are, and whatever the qualities of their previous life-years are, whether it is 
person i or person j that receives the extra life-year is neutral. Note that this conception of 
universality is weaker than conception U1, because it is here restricted to the subset of 
allocations in which the quality of life is constant along a given life. 
In order to explore the implications of the formulation U2 of the intuition of 
universality in terms of priority, a first, important, step, consists of examining the constraints 
that U2 imposes on the form of a social welfare function. Actually, it is shown in the 
Appendix that the account U2 of the intuition of universality has precise implications 
regarding the structure of the social welfare criterion to be pursued. 
 
 
Characterization Theorem (formulation U2 of the intuition of universality) 
 
A social welfare function W(.) satisfies the formulation U2 of the intuition of 
universality if and only if it takes the following form: 
 
W(q) = F(qi, qj, …, qN, ∑ li )  
 
where qi denotes the (constant) quality of life enjoyed at all his life-periods by 
individual i under the allocation q. 
 
 
What is stated here is a representation result that takes the form of a logical 
equivalence: any social welfare function that satisfies the property U2 must have that 
particular form, and, also, any social welfare function that satisfies that form must also satisfy 
the formulation U2 of the intuition of universality. Quite interestingly, the form taken by the 
social welfare function is simple: it is a function of the (constant) qualities associated to the 
life-years of all individuals, and, also a function of the total lifetime in the population.
9
  
An important corollary of this representation result is that, under the conception U2 of 
universalism, the particular distribution of life-years within the population does not matter; 
the only thing that matters concerning lifetime is the total amount of life-years that are lived. 
Whether the lifetime is shared more or less equally within the population does not matter.  
That corollary is particularly counterintuitive. When considering the allocation of life-
years within a population, a social planner may prefer, on the grounds of social justice, that 
life-years are distributed more equally across individual lives. Such an egalitarian perspective 
is clearly incompatible with the formulation U2 of the intuition of universality. Being 
                                                          
9
 Given that we consider populations of constant sizes, the social welfare function W(.) can also be regarded as a 
function of the average lifetime in the population. 
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universalist under the U2 conception implies being socially indifferent between allocations 
that keep the total number of life-years constant, independently from how those life-years are 
distributed in the population.  
To put it in different terms, the formulation U2 of the intuition of universality leads to 
be indifferent with respect to the distribution of life-years across individuals, and, as such, this 
is incompatible with the idea of giving priority to the poor, who can be here represented as 
individuals with shorter lives and lower qualities of life. The formulation U2 of the intuition 
of universality prevents giving priority to those disadvantaged individuals.  
Note that this result only presupposes the formulation U2 of the intuition of 
universality, and is not based on a particular assumption concerning the way in which the 
social welfare function aggregates value functions V(.). Clearly, if the social ordering on 
allocations were based on the sum of individual value functions V(.), as in Section 2, one 
would also obtain social indifference with respect to the distribution of life-years within the 
population. This section provides a more general argument, according to which the 
formulation U2 of the intuition of universality leads inevitably to social indifference with 
respect to the distribution of life-years, whatever the precise way (additive or not) in which 
value functions V(.) enter the social objective. 
That corollary of the formulation U2 of the intuition of universality tends to question 
the attractiveness of universality when formulated in that particular way. If being universalist 
implies being indifferent with respect to inequalities in the length of life, then such a 
universalist perspective looks far from attractive. Ideally, we would like universalism to lead 
towards priority given to the disadvantaged, and, hence, towards more equality, and not to 
lead to indifference towards more inequality. We reach, here again, a negative result, but this 
negative result is relative to a particular formulation of the intuition of universality.
10
 
Let us now turn to the third conception of universality developed in Section 2. When 
reformulated in terms of its implications on the social preference ordering over allocations, 
the formulation U3 of the intuition of universality is defined as follows. 
 
 
 The intuition of universality (U3) 
 
 For all q in Q, for all z in R+, for all i, j, we have:  
(…(qi1, …, qili, z)…(…(qj1, …, qjlj)…) ~S (…(qi1, …, qili)…(…(qj1, …, qjlj, z)…) 
 
 
The property U3 states that changing the recipient of an extra life-year with quality z 
leads to social indifference, whatever the quality and the quantity of the life-years lived by the 
possible recipients. As such, it captures some intuition of universality, in the sense that the 
social evaluator is indifferent between giving an extra life-year to one person or to another, 
whatever the lives of those persons are.  
                                                          
10
 Note that this negative result is here reached while assuming a representativity of the social preference 
ordering by means of a social welfare function W(.). However, as shown in the Appendix, our result is actually 
more general, and does not necessarily require assuming the existence of such a representation. 
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Although that conception of universality may seem appealing, it faces the same 
problem as the conception U2 studied above: by valuing the allocation of life-years 
indifferently from the lives of the persons (in terms of their quantity and quality), the 
conception U3 of universality goes against the idea of giving priority to the disadvantaged. 
To see this, let us take a simple 2-person example, involving persons i and j. The 
initial allocation is: 
 
((qi1, qi2, …, qili), (qj1, qj2, …, qjlj)) 
 
The formulation U3 of the intuition of universality states that changing the recipient of 
a life-year, from, let us say, person j to person i, leads to social indifference. If the last life-
year of person j is reallocated to person i (with the associated quality qjlj), we thus have: 
 
((qi1, qi2, …, qili), (qj1, qj2, …, qjlj)) ~S ((qi1, qi2, …, qili, qjlj), (qj1, qj2, …, qjlj-1)) 
 
Then, by repeating reallocations of life-years successively, from person j to person i, 
one finally obtain: 
 
((qi1, qi2, …, qili), (qj1, qj2, …, qjlj)) ~S ((qi1, qi2, …, qili, qjlj, …, qj2), (qj1)) 
 
Thus property U3 leads to social indifference between two allocations that are 
extremely different: whereas in the initial allocation, the lifetime is divided between persons i 
and j, in the final allocation, almost the entire lifetime is concentrated on the person i, whereas 
only a single life-year remains for person j. That highly unequal distribution of lifetime does 
not seem to be as socially desirable as the initial allocation, but this is however what the 
formulation U3 of the intuition of universality implies. Repeated use of the universality 
property U3 lead to social indifference between allocations that are characterized by quite 
different degrees of inequality in the distribution of lifetime among persons. 
From the perspective of social justice, one would prefer, on the contrary, to give 
priority, in the allocation of life-years, to disadvantaged individuals, who have either shorter 
lives, or lives of worse quality. The intuition of universality is hardly compatible with giving 
priority to the disadvantaged. On the contrary, it leads to social indifference with respect to 
how life-years are allocated between persons. Here again, as for the formulation U2, the 
intuition of universality goes against this ideal of giving priority to the disadvantaged. 
Note also that, as for the conception U2, the argument provided here does not rely on a 
particular functional form for the social objective. Obviously, if the social goal is, as in 
Section 2, to maximize the sum of value functions V(.), then we would also obtain social 
indifference with respect to who receives the extra life-year. But the argument developed here 
is more general, since this does not postulate any particular social objective, that is, the social 
ordering does not need to be based on the mere sum of value functions V(.). We reach thus a 
robust result on the conflict of conception U3 of universality with giving priority to the 
disadvantaged. 
In sum, this section leads to quite negative results concerning the implications of the 
intuition of universality. We showed that either the intuition of universality is incompatible 
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with the monotonicity property (conception U1), or leads to social indifference with respect to 
how life-years are allocated within the population, which goes against the ideal of giving 
priority to the disadvantaged (conceptions U2 and U3). 
Whereas this section reached some negative results concerning the intuition of 
universality, one may wonder whether abandoning that intuition in favor of the intuition of 
complementarity would allow us to obtain more appealing implications. In particular, one 
may be curious to see whether adopting the intuition of complementarity would allow us to 
better meet the ideal of giving priority to the disadvantaged. That question is explored in the 
next section. 
 
 
4. The intuition of complementarity and the priority to the worst-off 
 
 
Under the intuition of complementarity, the value of a life-year depends on what that 
life-year allows for, that is, on the quality of that life-year. At first glance, one may believe 
that the intuition of complementarity, by leading to assign a higher value to life-years 
characterized by a higher quality (unlike the intuition of universality), could favor the 
allocation of life-years towards more life-years given to individuals who enjoy a high quality 
of life.  
But that belief is actually wrong: when allocating life-years, the valorization of those 
years is only one aspect of the problem. Another, crucial, aspect concerns the priority that the 
social evaluator assigns to the well-being levels of the different individuals, and, in particular, 
his aversion to inequality. When the aversion to inequality is large, it can offset the 
valorization dimension, and lead to assign more life-years to individuals with low life quality. 
It is actually quite simple to combine the intuition of complementarity with giving priority to 
the disadvantaged. 
To see that, let us assume that the value of an individual life takes a standard, time-
additive, form, that is: 
 
V(qi) = ∑t=i
li 
ui(qit) 
 
where ui(qit) represents the temporal utility associated to the life-year t for individual i. 
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume here that lifetime is continuous rather than 
discrete, and thus consider the equivalent form in continuous time: 
 
V(qi) = ∫t
li
 ui(qit) dt 
 
The social welfare function takes the general form: 
 
W(q) = W(V(q1), …, V(qN)) 
 
Within that framework, the marginal social welfare from increasing the duration of the 
life of individual i is given by the derivative: 
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∂W / ∂li = (∂W/∂V(qi)) ui(qili) 
 
The left-hand side of that equation is the variation in social welfare associated to a 
minor change in the duration of the life of individual i. This variation is equal to the product 
of two factors.  
First, it depends on the degree of priority of the individual from a social perspective, 
which is captured by the factor (∂W/∂V(qi)). This degree of priority clearly depends on the 
degree of inequality aversion exhibited by the social welfare function. If the person i is 
particularly disadvantaged, an inequality-averse social planner assigns a high weight to 
improving the well-being of that person. This first effect is the social weighting effect.  
Second, the marginal social welfare associated to a change in the duration of the life of 
individual i depends also on the value of this extra life-year for the individual, based on the 
quantity and the quality of his past life, and, also, based on the quality of the extra life-year 
itself. Clearly, one can expect that a life profile with a higher quality of life will generally 
imply a higher value for an increase in the duration of life. That second effect is the individual 
valuation effect (which may depend on individual subjective preferences or some other 
objective approach to the valuation of individual lives). 
In the case of increasing the lifetime of an individual whose life has low quality, the 
social weighting effect and the individual valuation effect go in opposite directions when the 
social planner is inequality-averse. In that case, the social weighting effect is strong, while the 
individual valuation effect is low. On the contrary, when considering the marginal social 
welfare from increasing the duration of life of a person whose life has high quality, the 
opposite arises: the individual valuation effect is large, while the social weighting effect is 
low. 
At the end of the day, whether a higher marginal social value is assigned to increasing 
the length of life of the person with a low or a high life quality depends on the degree of 
inequality aversion exhibited by the social welfare function, and, also, on individuals’ 
valuations of life. It is quite possible that a higher marginal social value is assigned to 
increasing the duration of life of a person with a low life quality, despite the individual 
valuation effect. This is definitely the case when the social welfare function exhibits a high 
degree of inequality aversion. 
To show this, let us take a simple analytical example, where the function ui(qit) takes 
the following form:  
 
ui(qit) = [qit
1-a
 – q0
1-a
] / (1 – a) 
 
Moreover, let us suppose that the social welfare function takes a standard Atkinson-
Stiglitz form (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980): 
 
W = ∑ (V(qi))
1-e 
/ (1 – e) 
 
where the ethical parameter e captures the sensitivity of social valuations to inequalities in 
well-being across individuals. When e equals 0, there is a zero degree of inequality aversion. 
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In that analytical example and supposing a constant quality of life qit = q
i
, the marginal 
social welfare gain from increasing the duration of life of individual i is equal to: 
 
∂W / ∂li = (liui(q
i
))
-e
 ui(q
i
) 
 
Note that, when the ethical parameter e equals 0, the marginal social welfare from 
increasing the duration of life of individual i is equal to ui(q
i
), and, hence, is increasing with 
the quality of life enjoyed by the person i. In that case (zero inequality aversion), the social 
weighting effect is dominated by the individual valuation effect, and so a larger priority is 
given to individuals with a higher quality of life. 
But that case is not the only possible one. Actually, under a large interval of values for 
the ethical parameter e, the opposite will take place, and the social weighting effect will 
dominate the individual valuation effect, leading to priority to the disadvantaged individuals. 
It is straightforward to see that, when the ethical parameter e equals 1, the marginal 
social welfare from increasing the duration of life of individual i is equal to merely 1 / li, that 
is, to the inverse of person i’s duration of life. Hence, in that case, a higher priority will be 
given to individuals with a shorter life, and a lower priority to individuals with a longer life. 
Alternatively, when e is superior to 1, an even larger priority is given to the 
disadvantaged individuals, since the marginal social welfare gain from increasing the length 
of life of a person i is then not only decreasing with the duration of life of that person, but, 
also, decreasing with the quality of his life. Thus priority is here given to individuals with 
shorter lives and lives of lower quality. 
Those examples suffice to illustrate that it is possible – and actually quite easy – to 
accommodate the intuition of complementarity with the ideal of giving priority to the 
disadvantaged. The intuition is that the marginal social value of increasing the duration of life 
of a person depends not only on the quality of that life (through the individual valuation 
effect), but, also, on the weight that is given to improving the situation of that person in the 
social welfare function (the social weighting effect). When the latter dominates the former, 
priority is given to individuals with a shorter life and with a lower quality of life. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
 
Given that various policies – health policies, safety policies, development policies – 
influence mortality, and, hence, individual lifetimes, the valuation of life-years has become a 
necessary stage in the design of optimal policies. The definition of optimal policies in life-
affecting domains requires governments to be able not only to weight live-years against 
resources, but, also, life-years enjoyed by some persons against life-years enjoyed by other 
persons. Moreover, at the descriptive level, the measurement of economic development 
requires to be able to weight achievements in terms of longevity in comparison to 
achievements on other dimensions of life, and, also, to make longevity achievements in some 
countries comparable with longevity achievements in other countries. 
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When considering the valuation of life-years, two basic intuitions arise: on the one 
hand, the intuition of universality, according to which the value of a life-year should be 
universal, and, hence, independent from the duration and the quality of lives considered, and, 
on the other hand, the intuition of complementarity, according to which the value of a life-
year should depend on what that life-year allows for, and, hence, on its quality. 
Those two intuitions are plausible, but these are hardly compatible: the intuition of 
universality requires that the value of a life-year is universal, and, hence, does not depend on 
its quality, which goes against the intuition of complementarity, which makes the valuation of 
a life-year dependent on its quality. Thus a choice is to be made between those two intuitions 
concerning the valuation of life-years. 
In order to cast original light on that ethical dilemma, this paper proposed to provide 
several distinct accounts of the intuition of universality, and to explore their logical 
implications in terms of the valuation of life-years, and, also, in terms of the priority to be 
given to the disadvantaged when considering the allocation of lifetime within a population. 
Our results suggest that the intuition of universality, whatever the precise formulation 
considered, leads to implications that are far from appealing. Our accounts of the intuition of 
universality lead either to a conflict with a basic principle of monotonicity (i.e. the conception 
U1), or lead to a conflict with giving priority to the disadvantaged (i.e. conceptions U2 and 
U3). Those conflicts are quite problematic: imposing a universal valuation of life-years would 
lead to social indifference with respect to the distribution of lifetime within the population. 
Such social indifference would go against the ideal of equality, and, as such, is quite 
counterintuitive, and hard to justify.  
On the contrary, the intuition of complementarity can be compatible with the idea of 
giving priority to the disadvantaged, and, as such, does not imply a social indifference with 
respect to how life-years are distributed within the population, unlike the intuition of 
universality. The underlying intuition is that the dependence of the valuation of a life-year on 
the quality of life is only one aspect of the social valuation of life-years, which depends also 
on how individual interests are weighted in the social welfare function. It is thus possible, 
when the social welfare function exhibits a sufficiently high degree of inequality aversion, to 
conciliate the intuition of complementarity with the ideal of giving priority to individuals with 
low qualities of life. 
All in all, this paper suggests that the intuition of universality, although it may seem 
appealing at first glance, leads, at the end of the day, to the opposite of what it aims at: by 
valuing all life-years in a uniform way, the intuition of universality is not compatible with 
giving priority to the disadvantaged, and, hence, tends to play against equality. On the 
contrary, the intuition of complementarity can be made compatible with the ideal of giving 
priority to the disadvantaged, and, hence, is more compatible with equality.  
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7. Appendix 
 
 
The characterization result takes the form of an equivalence between a social welfare 
function W(q) satisfying property U2 and a social welfare function taking the form W(q) = 
F(qi, qj, …, qN, ∑ li). 
To prove that equivalence result, we proceed in two steps. 
 
Let us first prove that a social welfare function taking the form W(q) = F(qi, qj, …, qN, 
∑ li) satisfies the property U2. 
To see this, let us take a three-person case, with (constant) qualities of life a, b and c, 
and durations of life m, n, and o. Let us denote by a.m a life of m years with constant quality 
a. The allocation q is thus written (a.m, b.n, c.o). Let us now compare that allocation with 
another allocation, q’, where a life-year is transferred from the second person to the first 
person. The allocation q’ is thus written as (a.(m + 1), b.(n – 1), c.o). 
The property U2 requires that there is social indifference between allocations q and q’, 
that is: W(a.m, b.n, c.o) = W(a(m + 1), b(n – 1), c.o). 
It is easy to see that this equality is satisfied by any function taking the form W(q) = 
F(qi, qj, …, qN, ∑ li). Indeed, in our 3-person case, the function takes the form: W(a.m, b.n, 
c.o) = F(a, b, c, m + n + o). It does satisfy the equality mentioned above, since the transfer or 
a life-year maintains the total number of life-years unchanged. Indeed, we have: 
 
W(q) = F(a, b, c, m + n + o) = F(a, b, c, m + 1 + n – 1 + o) = W(q’) 
 
as required by property U2. 
The same argument could be formulated for any case with N > 3, with any transfer of 
life-years. Thus we have that any social welfare function taking the form W(q) = F(qi, qj, …, 
qN, ∑ li) satisfies the property U2. 
 
Let us now prove that any social welfare function satisfying the property U2 takes the 
form W(q) = F(qi, qj, …, qN, ∑ li). 
To prove this, let us turn back to our 3-person case. We have, by repeated use of the 
property U2: 
 
W(a.m, b.n, c.o) = W(a.(m + 1), b.(n – 1), c.o) 
     = W(a.(m + 2), b.(n – 1), c.(o – 1)) 
     = W(a.(m + 3), b.(n – 2), c.(o – 1)) 
     = … 
     = W(a.(m + n – 1 + o – 1), b.1, c.1) 
     = W(a.(l1 + l2 + l3 – (3 – 1)), b.1, c.1) 
 
Since the population size N = 3 is a constant, we thus have: 
 
W(a.m, b.n, c.o) = F(a, b, c, l1 + l2 + l3) 
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That is, the social welfare function takes the form W(q) = F(qi, qj, …, qN, ∑ li). A similar 
proof could be provided for any N > 3. 
 
 Finally, it should be stressed that, whereas the above proof assumes the existence of a 
representation of the social ordering ≤S, such an assumption is not necessary for the purpose at 
hand. Actually, it can be shown that there exists another preorder ≤* defined on ((qi)i, ∑ li), 
which is such that: 
 
((qi)i, ∑ li) ≥* ((qi’)i, ∑ li’) 
↔ 
(q1. (∑ li – N + 1), qi. 1) ≥ (q1’. (∑ li’ – N + 1), qi’. 1) 
 
 
 
